The Ethical Case for the Development of Means to Treat Aging as a Medical Condition
Aging is by far the greatest cause of human suffering and mortality. Yet is it in human nature to resist every change whether or not it is beneficial. It is also in human nature to accept what is. So the development of means to treat aging in order to prevent the present toll of suffering and death will be resisted, and then these means will come into being, exist, and be accepted. Along the way, a lot of ink will be spilled on why we should or should not make the world a better place in this way. Such is the way of things. Ignoring the debate to focus on building rejuvenation biotechnologies is probably the fastest way to create (a) therapies for aging that most people will choose to use and (b) a world in which most people accept this state of affairs as a good thing.
Humanity has long sought to mitigate the challenges of ageing and extend the span of healthy life. But for centuries, a story of resignation shaped the moral imagination: ageing and death were inevitable, so ethics concerned how best to accept them. This narrative is crumbling. Over the past few decades, biogerontology has revealed that ageing is not immutable. Lifespan has been extended by tenfold in nematodes and by 50% in mice. Cellular reprogramming, senolytic drugs, and genetic insights suggest that at least parts of the ageing process can be modified.
Due to the profound implications of such progress, ethical debate has followed close behind. However, most discussions have been dominated by consequentialist framings: balancing hoped-for benefits (e.g., reduced healthcare costs, productivity gains) against feared harms (e.g., overpopulation, inequality, loss of meaning). Both critics and advocates tend to treat longevity as a matter of projected outcomes, reducing the ethical question to a contest of demographic forecasts. What remains underexplored is a deeper foundation: whether anti-ageing research is justified independent of its consequences, rooted instead in duties, autonomy, and the intrinsic value of life itself.
We seek to further this discussion by grounding the case for longevity research not only in outcomes but also in respect for autonomy, self-ownership, and the intrinsic value of life itself. On this basis, we address three kinds of critiques: philosophical appeals to "naturalness", societal concerns about resources, justice, and stagnation, and individual worries about meaning and boredom, showing that none provide decisive objections. Beyond rebuttal, we highlight neglected benefits: longevity research drives technological integration like the Apollo program, affirms the priority of existing persons over abstractions, and liberates individuals from rigid age-based expectations. The moral baseline must flip: the burden now falls on defenders of forced ageing to explain why preventable suffering should continue.